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I. INTRODUCTION
A surgeon, concerned about the postoperative condition of a hand that has
been reattached following an accident, utilizes an innovative procedure called
pulse oximetry to determine that pulse and oxygen levels in the hand were
sufficient to save it without further invasive surgery. 1 A neurologist, faced with
what he thinks is a variant of lupus, discovers information which leads to a
diagnosis of Sjogren's disease and subsequently a therapy that would otherwise
not have been used.2 An emergency patient has a combination of cardiogenic
and anaphylactic shock, making resuscitation difficult. After stabilizing the
patient, the physicians obtain information that suggests concentrating on
reversing the anaphylaxis rather than the cardiac problems. This decision
proves critical to the patient's survival.3 What is the common link?. In each of
these cases, the information that enlightened or supplanted the physicians'
original diagnosis or course of action was gleaned from a computerized medical
literature database.
On-line services, while in existence since the 1970s, were not routinely
utilized by "end-users" 4 until the 1980s.5 It is only recently, however, that their
I See Donald A. B. Lindberg et al., Use of MEDLINE by Physicians for Clinical
Problem Solving, 269 JAMA 3124, 3126 (1993).
2 See id. at 3127.
3 See id.
4 The term "end-user" refers to the use of databases by the information seekers, as
opposed to more knowledgeable or skilled intermediaries. See K. Ann McKibbon et al., How
Good Are Clinical MIEDLINE Searches? A Comparative Study of Clinical End-User and
Librarian Searches, 23 CoMpuTES & BIOMEDICAL REs. 583, 584 (1990). It is only recently
that user-friendly interfaces and commercial vendor packages such as PaperChase and
Grateful Med, as well as CD-ROM technology, have created an environment where
physicians can access medical information without the help of a medical reference librarian or
commercial database search firm. See discussion infra Part Il; see also James R. Hilderand,
Computer Technology: Making Contributions to Patient Care, AM. DRUGGIST, Dec. 1994, at
52; Betsy L. Humphreys & Donald A. B. Lindberg, Computers in Medicine, 273 JAMA
1667, 1667 (1995); Medical Infornation Service Debuts, Business Wire, Sept 15, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE file.
5 See generally Kara Swisher, Internet's Reach in Society Grows, Survey Finds/
Internet's Popularity Grows with Public, Survey Fids, WASH. PoST, Oct. 31, 1995, at Al.
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use has become markedly mainstream.6 As is evident from the case studies
mentioned above, the medical field has not been immune to the databases'
advance. 7 Without leaving her office, a physician can quickly access a
centralized database containing over seven million references to approximately
3600 biomedical journals, 8 provided the physician has access to a computer, a
modem, a telephone line, and an on-line subscription. These databases allow
physicians rapid end-user access to current medical research. The access is so
quick, in fact, that a physician can retrieve information while
contemporaneously tending to a patient during an office visit9 or, remarkably,
during an invasive surgical procedure.10
The potential medical advantage of immediate information retrieval is
impressive. Recent clinical studies suggest not only that on-line medical
literature databases can be critically important in making diagnoses and
developing and implementing treatment plans, 11 they can also be a significant
factor in modifying patients' health behaviors, 12 creating a defensible
conclusion regarding a patient's eligibility for receipt of insurance benefits, 13
6 See id.
7 KAREN T. WALuNGFORD Er AL., U.S. DEPARTmENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, SURVEY OF INDIVIDUAL UsERS OF MEDLJNE ON THE NLM SYSTEM 1 (1988)
(finding a dramatic increase in the use of MEDLINE through the National Library of
Medicine ("NLM") system); see also McKibbon et al., supra note 4, at 583.
8 See Hilderand, supra note 4, at 53.
9 See, e.g., R. Brian Haynes et al., How to Keep Up with the Medical Literature: V.
Access by Personal Computer to the Medical Literature, 105 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
810, 810 (1986). The authors describe a clinical scenario where a patient with insulin-
dependent diabetes asks her doctor whether an insulin pump can prevent further retinopathy.
The doctor excuses himself, conducts a MEDLINE search, and finds an article in The New
England Journal of Medicine detailing the findings of recent studies which indicate that the
use of the insulin pump to treat retinopathy is still too speculative and unproven. The doctor
subsequently explains these findings to his patient, who is both thankful and amazed. See id.
10 See Norman Sohn & Richard D. Robbins, Computer-Assisted Surgery, 312 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 924, 924 (1985) (Letter to the Editor). In this well publicized case, surgeons
were engaged in exploratory surgery on a patient with an undiagnosed abdominal mass. Upon
performing a biopsy, they discovered a condition (sclerosing mesenteritis) with which they
were unfamiliar. Another surgeon quickly performed a MEDLINE search and obtained
information that advised against removing the mass. The operation was then terminated,
saving the patient from an unnecessary procedure. See id.
11 See Lindberg, supra note 1, at 3126-27.
12 See id. at 3127 (describing a family practitioner providing MEDLINE information on
diet management to a young patient in order to prevent further bouts with a recurrent illness).
13 See id. (noting that information obtained from a MEDLINE search, explaining that
patients suffering from membrano-proliferative glomerulonephritis rarely go into remission,
supported a physician's decision not to certify to the patient's insurance company that the
[Vol. 58:617
COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL LMIERATURE
and reducing the length of patient hospital stays and health care costs. 14
Furthermore, because modem on-line services are more efficient and user-
friendly than earlier attempts, 15 a database search is by far the most effective
method physicians can use to access the voluminous quantity of published
medical literature. 16 The efficacy of a medical literature database is even more
striking in light of the daunting nature of a manual literature search, 17 the
difficulties of which cause many physicians either to dispense with the textual
resource altogether or at least to subordinate its role as an information tool. 18
The general standard of care used to judge a physician is based, as is all
negligence law, on reasonableness. 19 That is, a physician is expected to render
a quality of care "consonant with the level of medical and practical knowledge
the physician may reasonably be expected to possess and the medical judgment
she may be expected to exercise." 20 When these expectations were first
patient no longer had the disease).
14 See Michele S. Klein et al., Effect of Online Literature Searching on Length of Stay
and Patient Care Costs, 69 ACAD. MED. 489, 492 (1994). This is the first quantitative study
that finds that a statistically significant relationship exists between a computerized medical
literature search on behalf of severely ill patients and a reduction in health care costs and
length of stay. See id.
15 See Joanne Silberner, On-Line Medicine, U.S. NEWS & WORM REP., Oct. 5, 1992,
at 87-88.
16 See R. Brian Haynes et al., How to Keep Up with the Medical Literature: IV. Using
the Literature to Solve Clinical Problems, 105 ANNALs OF INTERNAL MED. 636, 639 (1986).
17 See, e.g., David G. Covell et al., Infornation Needs in Office Practice: Are They
Being Met?, 103 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 596, 598-99 (1985) (noting that physicians cite
lack of time to look up information, a glut of information sources, and poor organization as
significant barriers to obtaining answers to questions in the medical literature); Jeremy Wyatt,
Use and Sources of Medical Knowledge, 338 THE LANCET 1368, 1368 (1991) (citing the
number of journals and the rate of journal growth as the most obvious disadvantages of the
medical literature, creating storage inconvenience and extraction problems); see also
discussion infra Part ll.B.
18 See, e.g., Covell et al., supra note 17, at 599. Although the computer database seems
to provide the answer to the literature proliferation problem, Dr. Donald Lindberg, head of
the NLM, estimates that only 15% to 20% of physicians have ever performed a literature
search themselves or had it done for them. See Silberner, supra note 15, at 87. This is the
primary reason that an evaluation of the legal significance of such neglect is so imperative to
the issues of medical malpractice and, more importantly, patient care.
19 See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). The general negligence
standard of "reasonable care" is described by the Restatement as follows: "Conduct of a
Reasonable Man: The Standard-Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which
he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances." Id.20 Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985). This is merely a general statement
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developed at common law, magistrates and judges could hardly envision the
communication liquidity that now exists in the health care field. However, by
incorporating malpractice law under the rubric of negligence, and thus
reasonableness, nineteenth century courts and practitioners were leaving room
for such an advance, regardless of whether the exact degree was known.21
Thus, as has been suggested, it seems not only logical, but also legally
necessary, to expect physicians to be accountable for the entirety of information
that is currently accessible to the medical world via computer information
databases; this expectation would engender a level of clinical decisionmaldng
and medical judgment consistent with modem-day technology. 22
Fortunately for physicians, and unfortunately for future malpractice
plaintiffs, the problems with this conclusion have both legal and practical
of the expectations the law has of physicians as stated by the Mississippi court in Hall. A
more complete statement of the standard of care to which physicians are held is found in Part
l of this Note. For a comprehensive historical review of the development of the medical
malpractice action, see Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmfid Error: The
Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1193. For an
introduction to the malpractice standard of care, see generally 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,
Surgeons, Etc. § 201 (1981); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 70 (1987).
21 See Silver, supra note 20, at 1201. As Silver explains, this is accomplished by
reference to the notion that reasonable care must be viewed in conjunction with the 19th
century notion of "surrounding circumstances," which itself is related to an actor's
knowledge. Such a formulation allows the standard to be transferred to various situations and
types of conduct without any requirement of changing its textual integrity. See id. at 1203-04.
2 2 See, e.g., 1 BARRY R. FURRow Er AL., HEALTH LAw § 6-2(a), at 362-63 (1995);
Simon Chester, Electronic Malpractice: Does Reasonable Competence Require Computer
Research?, A.B.A. L. PRAc. MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 23; Bradd N. Feldbaum,
Computers and Medical Diagnosis, N.J. L.J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 10; see also Arthur W.
Hafner, Computers and the Legal Standard of Care, 107 ARct-nvs oF OPmHAyMOLOGY
966, 966 (1989); Brian Kibble-Smith & Arthur W. Hafner, The Effect of the Information Age
on Physicians' Professional Liability, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 88-93 (1986). For an
interesting analogy concerning the potential for legal malpractice for omitting a LEXIS or a
WESTLAW search, see Chester, supra; Mark J. Newman, Shortcuts He@ Justify Online
Expenses: Computer-Assisted Research Can Both Reduce Costs and Improve Work Product,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at S-5 (explaining the many uses of on-line searching in legal
practice). One should note, however, that while making the legal malpractice comparison may
be academically enlightening, the analogy is practically misguided. The immediate
applicability and expeditious formation of newly adjudicated legal precedent provides a far
better case for demanding a LEXIS or WESTLAW search as a matter of law. Once decided,
legal opinion is essentially the law, albeit limited by jurisdictional grounds. Furthermore,
reliance on it by practitioners is judicially demanded. Newly tested medical opinion, however,
must withstand additional trials and countless methodological attacks from skeptical clinicians
before it is reasonably relied upon, much less associated with customary practice.
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dimensions. While "reasonableness" is the basic premise upon which medical
negligence law is based, in practice, the standard has been transformed into a
test dominated almost entirely by absolute deference to customary medical
dogma.23 Furthermore, while the case of Helling v. Carey24 marked a
departure from the practice of paying homage to medical custom,25 such
departures are not the norm.26 Ordinarily, until the medical community adopts
a particular procedure, technique, or methodology, a physician is not negligent
for failing to discover, consider, or adopt it.27 While computerized access to
medical literature has infinite clinical possibilities, many of which are
scientifically proven in their ability to assist with decisionmaking and patient
outcomes, the law's deference to medical custom operates to protect those
physicians who instead choose to rely on established procedures. 28
Additionally, while much has been accomplished with regard to establishing a
user-friendly, comprehensive, clinically effective literature-searching tool, there
is much yet to be done before any legal standardization can be considered. 29
The purpose of this Note is to present the current state of both medical
databases and medical malpractice law in the United States and to evaluate the
23 See discussion infra Part III; see also 1 FURROW Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2, at 361;
W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PRossER AND KEETON ON TrE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 187 (5th ed.
1984); Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1163 (1942);
Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528,
528 (1976).
24 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). For a discussion of Helling v. Carey, see infra Part
IlI.A.3.25 See Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:
The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213, 1247 (1975) (calling the Helling
decision an "abrupt" change in the traditional practice of judicial bowing to medical custom).
26 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 109. See also 1 FuRRow Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2,
at 361.
27 This generalization assumes both that one is in a jurisdiction that follows custom and
that the clinical innovation is not yet assimilated by the medical community to the extent one
would label it customary. This conclusion is relatively sound with regard to recently published
procedures or techniques. See Ann Lennarson Greer, State of the Art Versus the State of
Science, 4 INr'L J. oF TE . AssEssmENT iN HIATH CARE 5, 23 (1988) (discussing the
delay in technology diffusion from external sources into local medical behavior); see also
discussion infra Part mH.
2 8 See 1 FuRRow Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2, at 361. "Defendants trying to prove a
standard of care normally present expert testimony describing the actual pattern of medical
practice, without any reference to the effectiveness of that practice." Id. (emphasis added).
And, as this practice is generally given conclusive weight, the jury is unable to reject this
custom as negligent. See id.; see also Holt v. Godsil, 447 So. 2d 191 (Ala. 1984); Senesac v.
Associates in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900 (Vt. 1982).
29 See discussion infra Part II.
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legal and practical potential for merging the two. Part I of this Note provides
an overview of the computer information sources currently available to
physicians, as well as various clinical studies analyzing their use and
effectiveness. Part III then discusses the legal potential for incorporating these
modem computer information systems into the standard of care to which
physicians are held. Particular attention is given to the role of custom in
medical malpractice litigation, the alternatives to the traditional standard that is
currently used by the courts, and the legal and practical problems associated
with any assimilation of database technology, regardless of the legal approach
taken.
II. THE CURRENT TECHNOLOGICAL STATE OF
MEDICAL INFORMATION DATABASES
A. MEDLINE: Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How?
MEDLINE is the premier bibliographic database30 housed at the National
Library of Medicine ("NLM"), 31 containing references to over 3700
biomedical journals covering literature from 1966 to the present.32
MEDLINE 33 contains all citations published in the hardbound medical literature
30 While this Note concentrates primarily on MEDLINE, the NLM offers a number of
other databases to which a physician could gain access, often at no additional fee. These
include AIDSLINE--devoted to HIV-related information; BIOETHICSLNE-covering
ethical concerns and public policy issues; CHEMLINE and Chem ID-containing chemical
dictionaries; TOXLINE and TOXLIT--containing toxicological information; and
DIRLINE-a directory of 14,000 "information resources." NATIONAL LIBRARY OF
MEDICINE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERvICES, GOOD MEDICINE FOR YouR
INFORMATION NEEDS (1995) [hereinafter NLM, GOOD MEDICINE]. The total NLM database
system consists of over 40 on-line databases containing about 18 million references.
NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERviCEs, FACT
SHEEr: NLM ONLINE DATABASES AND DATABANKS (1994) [hereinafter NLM, FACT SEEr].
For the purposes of this Note, the reader should assume that any reference to MEDLINE
generically refers to the entire NLM network.
31 In 1956, the Armed Forces Medical Library was designated as the National Library
of Medicine. See National Library of Medicine Act, Pub. L. No. 84-941, 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. (70 Stat. 960) 1134. The purpose of the NLM was to "aid in the dissemination
and exchange" of scientific and medical information. Id. § 371. Authorization for the NLM is
currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 286 (1994).
32 See NLM, FACT SHEEr, supra note 30; see also Hilderand, supra note 4, at 52.
33he first of NLM's computer databases was MEDLARS, developed by NLM to
automate the Indix Medicus topical index system. See Kibble-Smith & Hafner, supra note 22,
at 81. MEDLARS was converted into MEDLINE (MEDLARS On-Line) so that the resource
[Vol. 58:617
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citation resource called Index Medicus and corresponds in part to the
International Nursing Index and the Index to Dental Literature.34 The database
contains over 7.8 million citations from medical literature, with 31,000 new
citations added each month. 35 By using a structured system of Medical Subject
Headings ("MeSH"), consisting of approximately 18,000 annually updated
terms,36 each of these citations is comprehensively indexed and cross-
referenced with MeSIs used to identify information contained in the source
article to which the citation refers. A physician inputs various search terms
resulting in retrieval of all bibliographic citations that contain the terms. 37 A
typical citation contains information describing the author, title, source,
publication date of the reference, and an abstract providing a brief description
of the article. 38 As only a citation and an abstract are retrieved from a
MEDLINE search,39 one must visit the local medical library to obtain the
source in full-text form or download the article from a commercial service.
Various commercial services, referred to as vendors, provide end-user
access to the MEDLINE database by providing a software package and
terminal that accesses NLM holdings.40 A start-up package, including both
software and a user password, costs around $30, with search costs ranging
could be made available to the public by way of commercial vendors, see id., such as BRS
Information, Dialog Information, Compuserve Inc., and National Technical Information
Services. See Hilderand, supra note 4, at 54.
34 NLM, FACr SHEEr, supra note 30.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See Hilderand, supra note 4, at 54.
38 See id.
39 While only citations and abstracts are available through a standard MEDLINE search,
Mead Data systems (the vendor responsible for LEXIS/NEXIS) offers full-text retrieval
capability with user-friendly access. This system, called MEDIS, allows physicians or
medical students access to the full text of stored documents, eliminating one of the major
drawbacks of MEDLINE. While the number of journals accessible is fewer than the number
of journals available through MEDLINE, users can access MEDLINE through MEDIS, still
subject, however, to MEDLINE's limitations. See Kibble-Smith & Hafner, supra note 22, at
84.
40 See Hilderand, supra note 4, at 54. The Grateful Med software package, available
directly from the NLM, provides physicians with a more user-friendly environment for
searching MEDLINE, assisting the user's search by automatically logging on to the NLM
computer, prompting the user to enter search information, and helping the user select
appropriate MeSH search terms. See NLM, GOOD MEDICI-E, supra note 30. PaperChase is
another popular software package which provides end-user access to the NLM system. See
Gary L. Horowitz, PaperChase: A Computer Program to Search the Medical Literature, 305
NEw ENG. J. MED., Oct. 15, 1981, at 924.
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from $15 to $32 per hour of use.41 Most vendors also charge $8 to $10 for
each full-text journal article that the user chooses to download onto a printer or
diskette.42
End-users can also obtain access to MEDLINE via the CD-ROM format.43
The discs, which cost about $2000 per year, can hold about 330,000
typewritten pages of text each44 and make it possible to provide MEDLINE
directly to clinicians without telecommunications difficulties and on-line user
charges. MEDLINE use via CD-ROM is characterized as more enjoyable and
user-friendly than the traditional on-line methods,45 as well as being more cost-
effective, particularly for the frequent database user. 46
B. The Relevance of Ready Access to Information on Patient Care:
Clinical Uses
In 1985, Covell, Uman, and Manning47 published the results of a study
analyzing the information needs of forty-seven physicians during a half-day of
typical office practice. Physicians raised 269 questions during a series of 409
patient visits. Although responses to a pre-trial questionnaire showed that
information was needed an average of once per week, the study indicated that
these physicians actually formulated about two questions for every three
patients seen. Seventy percent of these questions were related to either
treatment of specific conditions, diagnosis of symptoms, physical findings, or
drug information. 8 Yet, while a substantial number of questions were routinely
generated by physicians in the survey, the answers were found only 30% of the
time!49
41 See Hilderand, supra note 4, at 54.
42 See Silberner, supra note 15, at 89.
43 See Hilderand, supra note 4, at 54.
44 See id.
45 See Prudence W. Dalrymple, CD-ROM MEDL1NE Use and Users: Information
Transfer in the Clinical Setting, 78 BULL. ME. Lina. Assoc. 224, 229 (1990).
46 See Hilderand, supra note 4, at 54. As the perceived costs of time, effort, and money
can act as a significant barrier to a physician's information seeking habits, "the easy,
unlimited access to current information that CD-ROM technology makes possible can be a
strong argument for placing such a system in the [medical] clinic or office." Dalrymple,
supra note 45, at 231.
4 7 See Covell et al., supra note 17, at 596.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 598. While information barriers were responsible for this infrequency at
least in part, the researchers suggest that the number of questions generated during the half-
day office practice may have been stimulated somewhat by the interviewing process, which
was conducted subsequent to each patient visit. Furthermore, information needs were often
[Vol. 58:617
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Data from other studies confirms these conclusions.50 One researcher
evaluated physicians' awareness of current medical practice and found that the
strongest predictor of the drugs that doctors prescribed was an individual
physician's year of qualification.51 In essence, these physicians had ceased to
assimilate vital information after a fixed period of time. In yet another study,
conducted by Williamson in the mid-1980s, over a third of the specialists
surveyed were entirely unaware of the medical value of glycosylated
hemoglobin, a substance useful in the assessment of diabetics, and about half
were without knowledge of the dangers of digoxin in elderly patients with
uncomplicated heart failure. 52
What makes the Williamson study astonishing is that in each case, reliable
evidence had been published and widely disseminated in the medical
literature.5 3 The clinical usefulness of up-to-date medical literature with regard
to patient care, diagnosis, and treatment has been lauded by numerous health
care professionals.54 With respect to literature's effect on a physician's
diagnostic thinking, surveyed residents indicated that they learned something
new from journal articles 86% of the time.5 5 With the benefits of literature
stated in terms that did not require a search for an immediate answer, or even an answer at
all. See id. at 599.
50 See, e.g., Jerome E. Osheroff et al., Physicians' Information Needs: Analysis of
Questions Posed During Clinical Teaching, 114 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 576 (1991)
(concluding that it is difficult to satisfy information needs for clinicians).
51 See C. Edward Evans et al., Does a Mailed Continuing Education Package Improve
Physician Performance? Results of a Randomized Trial, 255 JAMA 501 (1986).
52 See John W. Williamson et al., Health Science hIformation Management and the
Continuing Education of Physicians, 110 ANNALS OF INTERNAL ME. 151 (1989).
53 See Wliamson et al., supra note 52, at 151-60. A 1991 trial by Osheroff confirmed
these results. See Osheroff, supra note 50. After finding that, on average, five clinical
questions were raised by physicians for each patient seen (supporting the 1985 study by
Covell et al., supra note 17), researchers further explained that answers to 23% of these
questions could be found by reference to a textbook, journal, or MEDLINE. See Osheroff,
supra note 50, at 576; see also R. Brian Haynes et al., Online Access to MEDLINE in
Clinical Settings: A Study of Use and Usefiuness, 112 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 78, 81
(1990) (noting that 47% of clinical decisions made by physicians were affected by recent
literature gleaned from MEDLINE). But see Wyatt, supra note 17, at 1369 (noting the
surprising result of "how often there is no answer in literature for the patient-care questions
that emerge").
54 See, e.g., Haynes et al., supra note 16, at 636; Georgia Scura & Frank Davidoff,
Case-Related Use of the Medical Literature: Clinical LIbrarian Services for Improving Patient
Care, 245 JAMA 50, 51 (1981) (noting that medical literature affected patient treatment in
20% of cases studied, compared with the fact that only 5% of laboratory tests ordered actually
affected treatment).
55 See Scura & Davidoff, supra note 54, at 51.
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clinically useful, statistically substantiated, and readily available, why is it that
physicians are failing to take advantage of this valuable resource?
The primary reasons56 for this reluctance are (1) the rapidly increasing
volume of literature available and (2) the reliance by physicians on informal
information sources. Professional literature is a source of continuing medical
education for most health care providers, 57 due in primary part to its case-
related nature and timelines. However, without an expeditious and efficient
system of information retrieval, physicians tend to rely on other more informal
and less scientific sources like other physicians and health care professionals. 58
The increase in the number of journal titles since 1870 is staggering, with the
number doubling every nineteen years. 59 This exponential increase makes
journal researching a daunting task for many physicians, not only with regard
to conducting medical library searches, but also in referencing their personal
office libraries. 6° Proper searches take an appreciable amount of time, and
without efficient organization and referencing, any manual searching of all
relevant sources is disruptive to a physicians' patient-care responsibilities. 61
The volume of medical literature and the difficulty in gaining access to it
serves, at least in part, to further entrench the medical community into its
traditional form of information-seeking behavior-intra-professional advice
seeking. 62 The colleague as an information source solves a number of retrieval
56 Other factors are cited, including the lack of clinically practical articles, see Joanne G.
Marshall, Issues in Clinical Information Delivery, LIBR. TRENDs, June 22, 1993, at 83, and
lack of trust due to perceptions of inaccuracy or poor statistical design, see Wyatt, supra note
17, at 1370. See also discussion infra Part mU.
57 See, e.g., E. Ray Stinson & Dorothy A. Mueller, Suwvey of Health Professionals'
Information Habits and Needs, 243 JAMA 140, 140 (1980) (finding that medical literature
was the most common source of information for health professionals). But see Covell et al.,
supra note 17, at 597 (finding that physicians' perceptions of frequency of searching medical
information to solve clinical problems was higher than their actual use); Arnmin D. Weinberg
et al., Informal Advice- and Information-Seeking Between Physicians, 56 J. MED. Einuc. 174
(1981) (discussing the informal information-seeking behavior of physicians seeking advice
from colleagues as precipitated, at least in part, by the avalanche of and difficulty in gaining
access to new medical information).
58 See Covell et al., supra note 17, at 597; Weinberg et al., supra note 57, at 174; see
also Williamson et al., supra note 52, at 152. For a comprehensive overview of the
information seeking habits of physicians and an analysis of the major published studies dealing
with this issue, see generally Marshall, supra note 56.
59 See Wyatt, supra note 17, at 1370.
60 See Covell et al., supra note 17, at 597.
61 See Scura & Davidoff, supra note 54, at 50.
62 See Weinberg et al., supra note 57, at 174-75; see also Covell et al., supra note 17,
at 597. Particularly susceptible to this phenomenon are office-based physicians, as opposed to
those in teaching or research settings. See Marshall, supra note 56, at 83.
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problems, including proximity of information and ease of access. 63 However,
this practice tends to encourage the phenomenon of medical knowledge
stagnation by impeding the diffusion of knowledge from external sources (like
medical or other scientific journals) into the general medical community.64 As
one researcher explains, "[L]ocal life reinforces local 'knowledge.'
Associations, interests, and habits require and elicit continuity of behavior."
65
Physicians themselves question the efficacy of looking exclusively to medical
"opinion leaders," 66 as there is no guarantee that a colleague's recall is
adequate.67 Additionally, this behavior fails to provide the same learning
experience as one would gain by looking directly to a textual source.
68
The medical literature database may afford a solution to ineffective
information retrieval behavior. The use of automated information retrieval
seems like the logical solution to bridge the gap between physicians and cutting-
edge research, as well as to reduce the cycle of resorting to colleagues who
may themselves be unaware of recent literature. Recent studies support the
effectiveness of MEDLINE with respect to literature retrieval ability, ease of
use, cost effectiveness, and patient care.69 MEDLINE provides ready access to
over seven million sources of medical knowledge. Yet, with all of these
statistical and practical testimonials, one NLM official suggests that only 15 %
to 20% of physicians have ever accessed the MEDLINE system,70 a choice that
63 See Covell et al., supra note 17, at 597.
64 See Greer, supra note 27, at 23; see also David M. Eddy, C/inical Policies and the
Quality of Clinical Practice, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 343, 343 (1982) (describing the creation
of medical practice standards through "comments at meetings and grand rounds to
conversations in x-ray reading rooms and hospital cafeterias.... For these purposes, a policy
maker is anyone who makes an unambiguous public recommendation about the management
of a particular clinical problem.").
65 Greer, supra note 27, at 23.
66 See, e.g., Haynes et al., supra note 16, at 638 ("[Tihere is no guarantee that the
expert will be a good judge of the quality of evidence or be organized enough to give you the
exact citations you need."). However, as one researcher has said, "[computerized
information] services are designed to complement rather than replace these other
services... because the information required is more detailed or more current than that
available from... a consultant." Scura & Davidoff, supra note 54, at 52; see also Weinberg
et al., supra note 57, at 179 (discussing the positive role that opinion leaders can play in
"expediting the translation of advances in biomedical research" into clinical practice); Wyatt,
supra note 17, at 1368 (supporting the use of formal, centralized physician networks in
assisting in the diffusion of medical information).67 See Haynes et al., supra note 16, at 638.
68 See Covell et al., supra note 17, at 599.
69 See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 14; Lindberg et al., supra note 1.
70 See Silbemer, supra note 15, at 89 (quoting Dr. Donald Lindberg, head of the NLM).
This statistic includes searches performed by librarians for physicians. See id.
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might result in deleterious effects on the quality of patient care in the United
States. 71
1IH. HIGH-TECH MEETS THE LAW: THE MERGER OF DATABASES INTO THE
REALM OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
A. The Medical Malpractice Cause of Action
1. The Medical Standard of Care
The history of medical malpractice and its relation to general negligence
law is described by one legal scholar as "a maze of judicial mistakes one
century in the maldng."' 72 At the very least, medical malpractice actions are
fundamentally distinct from an ordinary negligence action.73 Generally, in
order to recover damages for a defendant's negligent conduct, a plaintiff must
plead and prove (1) that a duty was owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2)
that the duty was breached by the defendant; (3) that breach of the duty was the
cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered harm. 74
The existence of a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is
judicially imposed by virtue of the relationship existing between the parties. 75
71 For another quality of care issue regarding the legal implications of cost containment,
see Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 985 (1986); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard
of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1719 (1987).
72 Silver, supra note 20, at 1193. This quote describes the divergence of medical
malpractice jurisprudence from general negligence law, a divergence that, according to
Silver, was a result of "linguistic laziness" such that the two fields are now erroneously
thought to rest upon "distinct doctrinal foundations." Id. at 1193-94.
73 This distinction is based primarily on the law's deference to medical custom in
determining the standard of care to which medical professionals must subscribe. See generally
KEETON Er AL., supra note 23, § 32, at 189; Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder,
Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice Environment Problems, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 421,440 (1989); Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VAND. L. REv. 549, 605-06 (1959); Silver, supra note 20 (describing the development of the
malpractice cause of action and its divergence from the general negligence standard).
74 See KEmrON Er AL., supra note 23, § 30, at 164-65; see also Knight v. United States,
498 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Arneson v. City of Fargo, 303 N.W.2d 515 (N.D.
1981); Strother v. Hutchinson, 423 N.E.2d 467 (Ohio 1981) (per curiam); Lawyers Sur.
Corp. v. Snell, 617 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); RESTATEMEmr (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 281 (1965).
75 Thus, as explained in the Restatement: "[Tlhe interest which is invaded must be one
which is protected.. .. " RsrAATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 281 cmt. b (1965).
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Where there is a duty owed by one party to another, the standard of care to
which the defendant will be held is that of reasonable care under the
circumstances, or that which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in a
similar situation.76 The ultimate arbiter of whether the defendant acted
reasonably is generally the trier of fact.77 Thus, it is the role of the judge to
determine the legal existence of a duty and the function of the jury to decide
whether the duty was met by the defendant.
Whether its origin is found in contract or via the consensual, fiduciary
relationship between the parties, 78 courts have universally held that a physician
76 This "reasonable person" standard has been adopted by the writers of the
Restatement. See id. § 283. "Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he
must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances."
Id. In describing the reasonable man, the Restatement goes on to say:
The words "reasonable man" denote a person exercising those qualities of attention,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for the
protection of their own interests and the interests of others. It enables those who are to
determine whether the actor's conduct is such as to subject him to liability for harm
caused thereby, to express their judgment in terms of the conduct of a human being.
Id. at cmt. b. "Sometimes this person is called a reasonable man of ordinary prudence or an
ordinarily prudent man, or a man of average prudence, or a man of reasonable sense
exercising ordinary care. It is evident that such phrases are intended to mean very much the
same thing." Id. at cmt. c.
77 As explained by the Restatement:
The chief advantage of [the reasonable man] standard is that it enables triers of fact who
are to decide whether the actor's conduct is such as to subject him to liability for
negligence, to look to a community standard rather than an individual one, and at the
same time to express their judgment of what that standard is in terms of the conduct of a
human being.
Id.
However, this is not to say that the jury should view the defendant's conduct in light of
what they, the jury, would have done. As the Restatement explains:
The reasonable man is a fictitious person who is never negligent, and whose conduct is
always up to standard. He is not to be identified with any real person; and in particular
he is not to be identified with the members of the jury, individually or collectively. It is
therefore error to instruct the jury that the conduct of a reasonable man is to be
determined by what they would themselves have done.
Id. 78 There has been much made of whether the duty of care owed by a physician to a
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owes a legal duty of care to his patient.79 The legally formulated medical
standard of care owed by a physician is described in the seminal case of Pike v.
Honsinger:80
Upon consenting to treat a patient, it becomes [the physician's] duty to use
reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of his skill and the application of
his learning to accomplish the purpose for which he was employed. He is
under the further obligation to use his best judgment in exercising his skill and
applying his knowledge. The law holds him liable for an injury to his patient
resulting from want of the requisite knowledge and skill, or the omission to
exercise reasonable care, or the failure to use his best judgment. 81
The court in Pike and other courts throughout the nation82 describe a multi-part
standard of care to which physicians will be held. First, the physician must
possess a reasonable degree of skill and learning. Second, she must apply this
skill and learning in a reasonable manner. Finally, she must use her best
judgment when faced with alternatives, but will not be liable for a mere error in
judgment provided the physician does what she thinks is best after careful
examination.
On its face, the standard looks like a logical modification of the general
patient arises out of contract implied by law or is due to the nature of the fiduciary, doctor-
patient relationship. See, e.g., ANGEA RODDEY HOLDER, MEDiCAL MALRACTcE LAW 1-
42 (2d ed. 1978) (arguing that the physician-patient relationship is generally considered to be a
contractual one); 1 STEvEN E. PEGALUS & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF
MEDICAL MALI'RCrICE § 2:4 (1980). But see 61 AM. JuR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc.
§ 202 (1981) ("The duty of a physician or surgeon to bring skill and care to the amelioration
of the condition of his patient does not arise from contract, but has its foundation in public
considerations which are inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling... ."). For
the purposes of this Note, one need only understand that a duty does exist.
79 See McCoid, supra note 73, at 553-75.
80 49 N.E. 760 (N.Y. 1898).
8 1 Id. at 762.
82 Another frequently cited recitation of the standard to which physicians are held is
found in Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985):
[Tihe physician's non-delegable duty of care is this: given the circumstances of each
patient, each physician has a duty to use his or her knowledge and therewith treat
through maximum reasonable medical recovery, each patient, with such reasonable
diligence, skill, competence, and prudence as are practiced by minimally competent




negligence standard that accommodates the unique knowledge, skill, and
activities of a practicing physician. Yet, this standard functions quite differently
in actual practice. First, as a member of a learned profession possesses skill and
knowledge beyond that of ordinary individuals, doctors and other health care
professionals are required to act in a manner consistent with these added
capabilities.8 3 This "professional standard of negligence" to which physicians
and other professionals are held incorporates the added skill and knowledge
inherent to professional credentials into the required duty of care. Thus, the
"reasonable person" becomes the "reasonable physician." 84 However, in most
jurisdictions, this reasonable physician is not expected to meet the standard of
the "best trained," "most knowledgeable," or even a "reasonable" physician,
but instead is held to employ such knowledge and ability as would the
"minimally competent" physician, the "average" physician,85 or "as is
common or customary within the profession." 86
Second, while general negligence law leaves the task of defining the
standard of care and the determination of whether that standard is breached to
the judge and jury respectively, in malpractice cases this task is delegated to the
medical profession. Arguably, only another physician can instruct the court and
jury as to the conduct of a minimally competent or average physician under the
circumstances, and expert testimony is generally required to establish this
83 See King, supra note 25, at 1235; see also KEErON Er AL., supra note 23, § 32, at
185-86.
84 As formulated by the Restatement: "If the actor has in fact more than the minimum of
these qualities, he is required to exercise the superior qualities that he has in a manner
reasonable under the circumstances. The standard becomes, in other words, that of a
reasonable man with such superior attributes." RESrATEMEN" (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289.
cmt. m (1965).
85 See, e.g., Kobos v. Everts, 768 P.2d 534, 538 (Wyo. 1989) (stating that the
malpractice standard of care is measured by the knowledge and ability of the average
physician). But see Hall, 466 So. 2d at 871 (noting standard to be that of the "minimally
competent physicians in the same specialty or general field of practice throughout the United
States"). The distinction between "average" and "minimal" is an important one, because
"minimal" suggests a less rigorous standard than holding a defendant to an average, or mid-
point, of professional conduct. As one commentator suggests, such a semantic difference can
be of vital significance in that a jury decision may differ depending on how negligence
instructions are written. See 1 FuRRow Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2, at 362.
86 This language, based on the so called "common calling" rule, was one of the early
formulations of the professional malpractice standard. See Silver, supra note 20, at 1203-11.
Furthermore, it is one of the traditional justifications offered in support of the current
malpractice standard which defers to the medical community in establishing professional rules
of conduct. See McCoid, supra note 73, at 607. This standard is often criticized, primarily
due to the fact that other "common callings" are not afforded the same deference as is the
medical profession. See id.
19971
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
standard and whether the defendant physician complied with it.87
The trial process generally proceeds as follows. First, the plaintiff presents
an expert witness at trial to establish her prima facie case, which must
necessarily include evidence as to both the standard of care and a breach of that
standard as testified to by the medical expert.8 8 The defendant then, to avoid a
directed verdict in the plaintiff's favor, must provide contrary medical expert
testimony89 asserting either that the standard of care is not as the plaintiff
claims, or that the standard of care is as claimed but the defendant's conduct
was in accord with said standard. The judge and jury have essentially no role in
the process of evaluating the defendant physician's conduct directly by applying
the objective "reasonable man" or "reasonable physician" standard, because
that task is taken care of by the medical experts. 90 Rather, the judge and jury
merely evaluate the persuasiveness of each side's competing display of experts
in light of other evidence presented.
The rationale underlying this shift of responsibility for standard setting and
conduct evaluation from the trier of fact to the medical community itself is
several fold. First, it is said that because juries lack the technical expertise to
87 As stated in FED. R. EviD. 702: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EviD. 702. The standard
or customary practice is normally established through expert testimony. Further, in any
jurisdiction, to withstand a directed verdict, the party seeking to admit testimony by way of an
expert must (1) qualify their medical witnesses as experts; (2) satisfy the court that the expert
testimony will assist the trier of fact; and (3) have the witnesses testify based upon the facts
that support their opinions. See 1 FURRow Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2(b), at 365. The expert
should, ideally, practice in the same specialty as the defendant. See id. Note, however, that in
some cases, plaintiffs can prove negligence using other methods. These methods include drug
company warnings and instructions, learned treatises, defendants' own admissions, plainiffs
testimony, negligence per se, common knowledge exceptions, and the examination of
defendants' experts. See id. at 367-70.
88 See 1 FURROW Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2(b), at 365 (explaining that expert
testimony is needed to establish both the standard of care and breach). This sentiment is
echoed in 7 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2090(a) (3d ed. 1940) and McCoid, supra note 73, at 614
("Courts in all jurisdictions appear to agree to the general principles that the plaintiff in a
malpractice action bears the burden of persua[sion] ... and that to meet this burden... must
generally rely upon the testimony of medical experts."); see also, e.g., Guerrero v. Smith,
864 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App. 1993). However, despite this general requirement, courts are
willing to permit the plaintiff to reach the jury without this evidence where the conduct of the
defendant is so grossly negligent as to be within the comprehension of the layman. See
McCoid, supra note 73, at 621. This doctrine is known as res ipsa loquitur. See id.




make independent judgments concerning the reasonableness of a given course
of medical conduct, the medical community must make these decisions for the
jury. These commentators contend that the medical community is the best judge
of what is competent medical practice. 91 Second, it is argued that the medical
community is granted a "preferred position" by the courts because of the nature
of professional activity. Physicians are intensively trained and must devote long
years of study to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to make sound
medical decisions. It is said that these decisions will be hampered where some
medical "outsider" is allowed to judge the physician's conduct based on after-
the-fact evaluations, causing the doctor to become hesitant to rely on his
developed instincts.92 Finally, it is sometimes argued that because a physician
has impliedly represented that she will follow the standard methods of the
medical community, it is to these standards that the physician should be held.93
These justifications, however, have not escaped criticism.94
2. The Role and Effect of Judicial Deference to Medical Custom
The unique features of the malpractice action provide the medical
profession with "the privilege, which is usually emphatically denied to other
groups, of setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting
their own practices." 95 The legal standard with which a nonnegligent physician
must comply is that which is customary or commonplace among physicians.
This standard is in direct contrast with that of ordinary negligence actions
where adherence to customary practice is merely evidence of reasonableness. 96
In a malpractice action, adherence to custom, as developed by the medical
91 See McCoid, supra note 73, at 607. However, as explained by Pearson: "[Jiuries are
often required to consider difficult scientific matters which are beyond the knowledge of
typical laypersons. Expert testimony may be required to educate the jury ... [but this] does
not in itself seem to be a sufficient justification for the medical custom rule." Pearson, supra
note 23, at 535.
92 See McCoid, supra note 73, at 608. But see Pearson, supra note 23, at 535-37
(criticizing McCoid's analysis).
93 See KE~roN Er AL., supra note 23, § 32, at 189.
94 While most courts at least impliedly adhere to these justifications, at least one
commentator questions the underlying assumptions on which they are based. Silver argues
persuasively that because judgment is always the "hingepin" on which negligence rams,
justifying a preferred status for physicians on this basis "is to ignore the fact that most human
activity requires judgment-day to day and minute to minute." Silver, supra note 20, at 1216
n.67.
95 KEmoN Er AL., supra note 23, § 32, at 189 (citation omitted).
96 See McCoid, supra note 73, at 606.
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community and testified to by the medical expert, 97 is held by many courts as
dispositive of reasonableness. 98
The legal consequence of this formulation is that when a plaintiff fails to
provide evidence concerning both customary practice and the defendant
physician's failure to conform thereto, the defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict.99 Evidence of "unreasonableness" with regard to decisionmaldng,
procedure, or diagnosis, is legally insufficient without the plaintiffs
establishment of these two prerequisites. 100 Plaintiffs have no opportunity to
question the standard practice as itself being unreasonable, for if the defendant's
procedure is in accordance with customary practice standards she satisfies her
legal duty.
Each specific sub-duty owed to a patient by a physician is governed
accordingly.10' For example, a physician's duty to make accurate diagnoses,
implement a course of treatment, and keep abreast of medical progress and
developing techniques are all judged by her adherence to the ordinary standards
of the medical practice. 102 If the medical community does not accept a
97 The inability of the medical community to agree on a specific set of practice standards
is the cause of much of the confusion with regard to the malpractice standard of care, as
experts can be found to disagree on many aspects of medical treatment and care. See Maxwell
J. Mehlman, Assuring the Quality of Medical Care: The Impact of Outcome Measurement
and Practice Standards, 18 L. ME. & HEALTH CARE 368, 376 (1990). Furthermore, a
national practice standard does not exist for many procedures or tools, and substantial regional
variations exist with regard to the use of many medical procedures with no clear difference in
patient outcome. See 1 FuRow ET At., supra note 22, § 6-2, at 362. For a discussion
concerning the development of practice standards within the medical community, see
generally Kinney & Wilder, supra note 73. It has been argued that established practice
standards would eliminate much of the controversy and confusion surrounding medical
malpractice, particularly with regard to the uncertainty of traditional deference to custom.
See, e.g., Gary W. Kuc, Comment, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician
Liability, 10 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 439 (1994); Richard E. Leahy, Comment,
Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to
Medical Malpractice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. Rnv. 1483 (1989); Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role
of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEATH MATRIX 369 (1995).
98 See McCoid, supra note 73, at 606.
99 See Morris, supra note 23, at 1163.
100 See 1 FuRRow Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2, at 361. As the authors explain, "Most
jurisdictions give professional medical standards conclusive weight, so that the trier of fact is
not allowed to reject the practice as improper." Id.
101 For a partial list of the various individual duties within the physician's general duty
of care, see generally 61 AM. JuR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 247 (1981). Some of
these include the duties to diagnose, to use evaluative procedures, to seek a consultation, and




particular procedure or technique, the physician's failure to adopt it cannot be
negligent if she chose the customary alternative. Of course, it is possible that
adherence to the customary practice may be unreasonable in light of a published
development or study indicating a contrary trend, as is evident by virtue of the
MEDLINE case-studies mentioned above. Yet, if this trend has not been
accepted by the medical community insofar as medical experts would call it
"customary medical practice," the defendant physician will generally not be
found negligent for her failure to adopt it.
The unique medical malpractice standard, unlike that afforded other
professions, 103 is far more forgiving to the practicing physician than the
ordinary negligence standard. 104 The physician is responsible for following,
and keeping up with, customary practice, a standard which often demands only
minimal competency. Many good physicians do assuredly evaluate and
consider new developments and cutting-edge research studies when making a
diagnosis or implementing a treatment plan. However, such diligence is not
legally demanded, provided the new technique or cutting-edge procedure is not
yet assimilated into the mainstream medical community. The danger this poses
to the patients, a danger inherent to any process of industry standard setting, is
frequently cited by critics as the primary reason for abandoning the practice and
returning to the general standard of reasonableness where custom is only
evidence of nonnegligence. 105
3. Helling v. Carey and Other Departures from Customary Practice
The general rule in tort actions involving negligence was aptly stated by
Justice Holmes in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Behymer:1°6 "What usually is
done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is
fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with
or not." 107 In other words, custom is not dispositive of reasonableness in most
negligence suits, but is accepted as merely evidence of reasonableness. Yet, as
mentioned above, most U.S. jurisdictions make an exception in the case of
103 See KEE'MN Er AL., supra note 23, § 32, at 189; see also Silver, supra note 20, at
1216 n.67 ("[The judgment required of the conscientious physician is not one whit more
subtle than that demanded of a conscientious lawyer, teacher, writer, engineer or probably,
any other person pursuing a skilled calling .... ").
1O4 See McCoid, supra note 73, at 607 ("IThe professional standard is assumed to offer
the medical practitioner as much if not more protection than would a more general
standard."); see also Morris, supra note 23, at 1165.
105 See, e.g., King, supra note 25, at 1216 n.10, 1255.
106 189 U.S. 468 (1903).
107 Id. at 470.
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medical malpractice, where adherence to custom is reasonable conduct.' 08
However, judicial deference to customary medical practice is not absolute
and not all courts accept such adherence as the primary determinant of quality
care. 19 The most extreme example of a court rejecting the customary practice
standard is found in the case of Helling v. Carey." 0 In Helling, the plaintiff
appealed from a judgment in favor of the defendant ophthalmologist, arguing
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that adherence to the
medical custom of not giving routine glaucoma pressure tests was not
dispositive of reasonableness."' The plaintiff complained that this failure
deprived her of arguing that the customary standards themselves were
inadequate and thus unreasonable. 112 The trial court was correct insofar as such
a charge was not mandated by the majority of U.S. jurisdictions.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and
found in favor of the plaintiff. 113 It would have been shocking enough to
mainstream legal theory if the court had simply found the jury instructions
faulty, and remanded for a new trial allowing the jury to pass on the
appropriate standard of conduct given both the customary practice and
plaintiff's evidence of the nature of the glaucoma test. However, the court went
much further and held, as a matter of law, that the reasonable standard of care
that should have been followed was to administer the inexpensive, harmless,
and effective 114 glaucoma pressure test regardless of what was customary at the
10 8 See discussion supra, Part II.A.2.
109 See Darling v. Charlestown Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (111. 1965)
(finding custom not dispositive of reasonableness); Lundahl v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp.
Assoc., 235 N.E.2d 671, 674 (11. App. Ct. 1968) (finding fact that usual or customary
treatment would not preclude possibility of negligence or want of skill); Favalora v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (rejecting the customary practice
relating to precautions to be taken to prevent patient from falling during an x-ray exam); Toth
v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968) (finding that where a
physician fails to employ his expertise or best judgment, he is not absolved from liability
because he followed customary practice); Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d
875 (App. Div. 1982) (finding that although conventional medical wisdom was that increased
oxygen was essential to the survival, of premature infants, defendants were not relieved of
liability); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that custom is never
dispositive of reasonableness where custom itself is unreasonable); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543
N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996) (finding that the standard of care applicable to physicians
cannot be established by the sum of the customs which those practitioners follow).
110 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
111 See id. at 982.
112 See id.
113 See id. at 984.
114 While the Washington court found the benefits of tonometry (a measure of
intraocular pressure which is elevated in patients with glaucoma) to far outweigh its cost,
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time. 15 While the Washington legislature later codified the medical standard of
care as that of the "average physician," 116 apparently rejecting the HelIing
approach, the Washington Supreme Court later reaffirmed its holding in the
1979 case of Gates v. Jenson.1 17
Most courts that have since dealt with a Helling argument reject the
Washington court's approach of establishing the standard of care as a matter of
law.118 However, there are courts that have held that custom is not dispositive
of the standard of care, thus allowing the plaintiff to at least argue that the
customary standard is itself negligent or unreasonable.' 19 These cases generally
involve either a readily understandable procedure or clear and abundant
evidence that a customary practice was contraindicated or out of date. 120 Other
courts refuse to consider custom conclusive evidence of reasonableness where a
defendant is aware, or should be aware, of the dangers associated with the
standard practice.' 21 In such jurisdictions, failure by the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant physician deviated from standard or customary practice will not
alone provide the defendant physician with a directed verdict and plaintiff will
be able to present evidence that customary practice is itself inconsistent with
what a reasonable doctor should follow.122 There is also evidence of a recent
trend to abandon custom altogether, eliminating the "average" or "minimally
competent" physician language from the health care provider's general legal
commentators have been critical of this conclusion. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
115 See Helling, 519 P.2d at 983.
116 After the Helling decision, the Washington state legislature enacted a statutory
definition of the plaintiffs malpractice burden, codified as WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.290 (West 1988). Apparently attempting to re-establish the pre-Helling malpractice
standard, it enacted the following: "[A malpractice] plaintiff. ... [must] prove ... that the
defendant or defendants failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning possessed at
that time by other persons in the same profession, and that as a proximate result of such
failure the plaintiff suffered damage...." Id. The Washington Supreme Court, however,
later interpreted the statute as consistent with Helling in Gates v. Jenson, 595 P.2d 919
(Wash. 1979). The standard was finally refined, allowing for improvement on custom without
relying on judicial fiat in Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., 663 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1983).
117 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979).
118 See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Ct. App. 1992);
Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1977).119 See cases cited supra note 109.
120 See, e.g., Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879-80 (App.
Div. 1982) (noting that a number of studies, including the defendant's own, indicated that
increased oxygen was both unnecessary and dangerous).
121 See, e.g., Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 373 (N.Y.
1982) (finding negligence where it was well known, and defendant was aware of the fact, that
oxygen placed infants at risk of certain complications).
12 2 See 1 FURoW Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2, at 361.
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duty, and instead holding each defendant to the standard of a "reasonably
prudent physician." 123 While experts are still necessary in such jurisdictions to
describe what each side deems reasonable medical practice, 124 adherence to
customary practice is not a safe harbor for the defendant physician. In these
jurisdictions, the jury is able to evaluate whether the defendant's procedure was
reasonable without the plaintiff being required to satisfy the prima facie
requirement of proving a breach of the customary practice.
Another potential for plaintiffs opposing the customary practice standard
utilizes the third prong of the general medical standard of care- the duty of a
physician to exercise good medical judgment. It is said that a physician is
required to employ her best judgment, but she is not liable for a mere error in
judgment.125 Thus, a doctor will not be second-guessed for doing what she
believes is best for her patient, but she will be found negligent where choosing
a poor alternative was the result of a sub-standard or negligent examination. 126
This standard assumes that there are multiple alternatives available to
physicians, some which are better than others, and that the physician will not be
held liable where there is reasonable doubt as to the proper course to follow.127
However, where the physician chooses a contraindicated procedure, makes an
incompetent decision, or incorrectly follows a course of treatment without fully
evaluating the risks, the physician may be found to have acted unreasonably. 128
Some courts utilize the "best judgment" wrinkle to find negligence
notwithstanding a physician's adherence to customary practice where
defendant's choice among the available alternatives was unreasonable in light of
contrary data. For example, in the New York case of Toth v. Commutnity
123 See KEEON Er AL., supra note 23, § 32, at 30 n.53 (Supp. 1988); see also Kalsbeck
v. Westview Clinic, 375 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Raines v. Lutz, 341 S.E.2d
194 (Va. 1986); Brown v. Dahl, 705 P.2d 781 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). A minority of states
have codified this language by statute. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Michie
1992) ("reasonably prudent practitioner"); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.70.040(1) (West
1992) ("the reasonably prudent health care provider").
12 4 See King, supra note 25, at 1241 (noting that even though an accepted practice
formulation is a modification of the traditional approach, experts would still normally be
required to offer their opinion as to the "reasonable expectations" of the medical community).
A similar argument can be used here where the inquiry is whether the defendant's conduct is
in accord with that of the reasonable physician.
125 See 1 PEGAUS & WACIsMAN, supra note 78, § 2:9, at 69; see also Phillips v.
Stillwell, 99 P.2d 104, 104 (Ariz. 1940) (noting that a physician is not liable for mere error in
judgment, but does promise to use his best judgment).
126 See 1 PEGAUS & WAC-sMAN, supra note 78, § 2:9, at 70.
127 See id. at 72.
128 See id. at 70.
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Hospital,129 the court acknowledged that a physician's adherence to customary
practice usually insulates her from liability. 130 However, the court explained,
where "a physician fails to employ his expertise or best judgment, and that
omission causes injury, he should not automatically be freed from liability
because in fact he adhered to acceptable practice."131 Thus, the court
continued, where a physician is aware that a certain course of conduct is found
to be dangerous, her failure to take adequate steps to ensure a patient's safety is
not acceptable even though the general medical community does not
customarily take such steps. 132 Other courts have followed this reasoning. 133
B. Assimilation Possibilities and Legal Hurdles
It is important to understand the nature of the MEDLINE database. It is
not, by itself, a medical decisionmaking device. Thus, the legal concerns
relative to the various medical expert systems currently being used by modem
practitioners are not entirely applicable. 134 Furthermore, a MEDLINE search
merely retrieves citations to published articles with accompanying abstract
descriptions. 35 The studies, procedures, techniques, and data found within
these published articles must be evaluated by the physician prior to its
application. Therefore, in light of MEDLINE's capabilities, any judicial
recognition of a computerized medical literature database is inextricably bound
to the database search results themselves, their relevance, their reasonableness,
129 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968).
130 See id. at 372.
13 1 Id. at 373.
132 See id.
133 See, e.g., Thomas v. WilfaC, Inc., 828 P.2d 597, 602 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding doctor negligent for failing to call poison control where woman advised him she
might be poisoned).
134 A medical expert system ("MES") is a knowledge-based computer software
application designed to assist doctors in the medical diagnostic process. An overview of the
legal implications and concerns surrounding these devices is found in Frank D. Nguyen,
Comment, Regulation of Medical Expert Systems: A Necessary Evil?, 34 SArA CLARA L.
REv. 1187 (1994). Much of the debate here concerns whether such systems should be
evaluated under negligence principles, as a service, or strict liability, as a product. See id. at
1193-96. As computer databases are not decisionmaking devices, but merely information
accessing devices, these concerns are not quite as relevant to the information provider.
Nevertheless, there is a possibility that search software will be deemed a product, and that
manufacturer liability could result should the program fail to function correctly due to no fault
of the physician. See Arthur W. Hafner et al., Computers in Medicine: Liability Issues for
Physicians, 6 INT'L J. CLIniCALMONrrORiNG & ComPrNG 185, 191 (1989).135 See discussion supra Part II.A.
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and their role in customary medical practice. It is unlikely that any court would
find the failure to conduct a MEDLINE search substantive or procedural
malpractice, absent proof that the failure to use the device was the cause of
plaintiff's harm. This is because the relevance of a MEDLINE search goes only
so far as the relevance and reliability of the information it retrieves.
With this in mind, the remainder of this Note will discuss the role that
MEDLINE's immediate information access capability might play in the medical
malpractice action and the legal and practical problems associated with such a
possibility.
1. The "Custom" Roadblock
Allowing the medical community a preferred status in the realm of tort law
has certain side-effects, both positive and negative. On the up-side, deference to
medical custom frees the judicial system from making value judgments and
legislative appraisals of medical practice, something the judicial system is
arguably ill-equipped to handle. 136 Following the Heling intrusion into the
practice of ophthalmology, for example, the medical community was critical of
the courts for judicially mandating a certain test for glaucoma in light of the
high rate of false positive results, 137 the lack of effective drug treatments for the
disease, 138 and the skepticism regarding whether early treatment will even halt
the progression of glaucoma at all. 139 Such arguments are persuasive, as is
evidenced by the reluctance of most courts to follow the Helling mandate.
On the down-side, allowing the medical community the substantial
insulation and benefit derived from setting their own standards of conduct has a
decidedly negative effect, particularly with respect to information assimilation
and the legal process. The MEDLINE advantage is that of information
136 See McCoid, supra note 73, at 607.
137 See BARRY R. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW: CAsEs, MATmALS AND PROBLEmS
161 (2d ed. 1991). The number of patients who test abnormally high who actually have
glaucoma is less than 1%. Thus, 99% of those who test positive must undergo further testing,
and are subjected to considerable stress and worry over a disease they probably do not have.
See id.
138 "[The most commonly used drugs to treat the disease... are not always effective
in lowering a patient's [intraocular pressure] or in stopping the progression of field defects."
David M. Eddy et al., The Value of Screening for Glaucoma with Tonometiy, 23 SuRv.
OPHTrALMoLOGY 194, 194 (1983).
139 See id. As the study explains, "From the available evidence, it does not appear that
earlier diagnosis makes a substantial difference in the patient's outcome. If all individuals over
40 years of age in a city of 1,000,000 were screened, the total cost of finding and treating
about 484 people with chronic simple glaucoma would be on the order of $4,944,866 or about
$13,000 per patient potentially benefited." Id.
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liquidity. Published data is immediately accessible to physicians, provided they
have the required software and hardware. This easy and efficient access to a
wealth of medical information is at least helpful within the clinical setting. 140
However, the concept of judicial deference to customary practice does not
require the medical community's utilization of up-to-the-minute information
retrieval. The specific duty to "keep abreast," a subpart of the general medical
duty, would be more accurately labeled a duty to keep abreast of customary
medical practice.141 MEDLINE is undoubtedly useful in eliminating the
information barriers between urban and rural geographic areas, thus further
eroding judicial use of the locality rule and facilitating a national standard of
medicine. 142 However, the use of MEDLINE by physicians already familiar
with customary practice, while arguably invaluable to patient care, is hampered
by legal malpractice methodology. Where customary practice is the rule, a
physician is not responsible for noncustomary procedures and techniques until
they are assimilated into the standards of practice. Therefore, regardless of
whether this information would assist the physician at the time of its initial
140 See discussion supra Part Il.
141 See Angela Roddey Holder, Failure to "Keep Up" as Negligence, 224 JAMA 1461,
1462 (1973). "Very few decisions have dealt with the sole question of whether or not a
physician has been negligent simply because he did not use the latest methods of treatment.
Those that have, however, apparently find a positive obligation to 'keep up' included in the
applicable standard of care." Id.
142 Until the middle of the century, most states established the standard of medical care
with reference to the defendant physician's individual locality, thus allowing for supposed
deficiencies in knowledge, information access, and technology. See Jon R. Waltz, The Rise
and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV.
408 (1969); see also Silver, supra note 20, at 1226-36 (describing the history of the locality
rule and the reasons for its demise). The rule was designed to protect rural practitioners by
holding them to the standard of a "reasonably competent physician operating in the same
community." Id. at 1226; see also McCurdy v. Hatfield, 183 P.2d 269, 271 (Cal. 1947). The
result was that only an expert from within the defendant physician's community could testify
as to local conditions. Silver outlines the two major reasons for the rule's demise: (1) a
plaintiff was frequently unable to secure an expert because medical colleagues protected one
another through the "conspiracy of silence"; (2) the rule created an anomaly whereby a
physician who served as a community's only doctor could never be held to standards higher
than her own. See Silver, supra note 20, at 1227. The courts eventually altered the standard to
hold physicians liable for the level of practice in communities "similar" to their own, thus
expanding the range from which plaintiffs could find experts. Most jurisdictions have now
moved to a national standard of care. See id.; see also King v. Williams, 279 S.E.2d 618, 620
(S.C. 1981) ("'The "locality rule" has no present day vitality.... ."' (quoting Pederson v.
Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1967)). Some courts still maintain a resources-based
caveat to the locality rule's elimination, where a physician will only be held accountable for
the technology available to her. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985).
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publication, only when such a technique or procedure becomes customary will
the physician be found negligent for failing to employ it.
This situation is particularly troubling in light of the inherent difficulties
associated with the process by which standard modes of medical practice are
established and new procedures are integrated.' 43 These difficulties are caused
in part by ineffective information diffusion.144 Although some clinical policies
are produced by medical societies, specialty associations, and government
"think-tanks" such as the Food and Drug Administration and the National
Institutes of Health, 145 the overwhelming majority of medical standards are
produced not by a singular, recognizable group but by thousands of physicians
acting individually. 146 Over a period of years, hundreds of comments, articles,
and reports converge to form a policy, which, if accepted by the majority of the
medical community, becomes the "standard practice." 147 Oversimplification,
lack of proper methodology, and overemphasis on empirical forms of
knowledge can result in unjutified conclusions. These conclusions can
snowball into a consensus about a certain clinical practice and, because even
doctors tend to believe what they hear most frequently, if a certain
recommendation is repeated often enough, it can quickly become standard
practice. 148 This cycle is then perpetuated as doctors tend to look to informal
information sources, such as other colleagues, for answers in lieu of looking
outside their own medical circles for new studies, data, or procedures 149 that
may call into question the standard methodology. 150 This cycle can impede the
adoption of new, better policies and continue adherence to traditional ones. As
one scholar explains, "[a] consensus may do no more than identify the point at
which all the errors, oversimplifications, and biases converge; it does not
necessarily identify what is best. "151
14 3 See James A. Henderson & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1382, 1391 (discussing the difficulties involved in custom formation, due in part to the
plethora of caretaking technologies).
144 Greer, supra note 27, at 23.145 See Kinney & Wilder, supra note 73, at 424-38 (discussing the two types of medical
standards-clinical practice protocols and utilization review protocols).
146 See Eddy, supra note 64, at 343; see also 1 FUmRow Er At.., supra note 22 § 6-2(a),
at 362 ("[Mlost clinical policies derive from a flow of reports in the literature, at meetings,
and in peer discussions.").
147 1 FURROW Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2(a), at 362.
148 See Eddy, supra note 64, at 345.
14 9 See Greer, supra note 27.
150 See Eddy, supra note 64, at 347 (recommending that clinicians understand that a
policy is not necessarily correct merely because it is "time-honored").
151 Id. at 345.
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The legal malpractice framework may actually serve to entrench poor
standards into mainstream practice, as adherence to custom is the benchmark by
which a physician's procedure is measured. A plaintiff's inability to present
evidence of an unreasonable customary practice standard offers physicians little
legal incentive to either evaluate the rationale behind a customary policy or
think critically about proposing change. 152 Because a plaintiff's attempts to
introduce evidence going to the unreasonableness of a customary practice will
be met with a losing judgment, the job of monitoring customary practice is left
entirely to the medical community. Although there are many conscientious
physicians who conduct MEDLINE searches as part of routine medical
procedure, the fact that MEDLINE use is still far from universal indicates that
many physicians are not conducting extensive literature searches. 153 While
some courts do offer limited protection to physicians who defy custom via the
respectable minority 154 and best judgment rules, 155 the lone physician who
dares to swim upstream with regard to clinical decisionmaking is likely to incur
malpractice risk. 156 Thus, while the bridge to current information is only a few
keystrokes away, the courts offer little incentive for physicians to incorporate
MEDLINE-discovered innovations into their practices.
What does this mean for potential malpractice defendants in a jurisdiction
that defers to customary practice? Unless customary practice is disputed, a
physician that proves compliance with the customary procedures of the medical
community will be entitled to a favorable judgment. This is not to say that the
implications of MEDLINE are entirely irrelevant to physicians practicing in a
customary practice jurisdiction. MEDLINE can be a major factor in penetrating
152 King argues that it is "specious to imagine that the health care market effectively
allocates medical resources so as to maximize the quality of health care." King, supra note
25, at 1237. Therefore, it may be incumbent on the courts to initiate such maximization.
153 See notes 70-71 and accompanying text. This conclusion is further supported by the
difficulty most physicians experience in conducting a manual search without MEDLINE's
assistance. See discussion supra Part II.B.
154 Where there are different schools of medical thought, and alternative treatment
methods, it has been held that the doctor is entitled to be judged according to the standards of
the school followed. However, this school must be a recognized one, and must be the
prevailing view in a "respectable minority" of the profession. See KEEroN Er AL., supra note
23, § 32, at 187. Therefore, the rule offers protection to those physicians seeking to innovate
or to those seeking to resist innovation.
155 As discussed earlier, the best judgment rule provides the physician deference with
regard to his medical judgment, provided it is made after careful examination. 1 PEGAUS &
WACHSMAN, supra note 78, § 2:9, at 70.
15 6 See generally Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs
and Customary Practice, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1375, 1377; Clark C. Havighurst, Altering the
Applicable Standard of Care, LAw & ComrEwtt. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 265.
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the knowledge barriers between rural and urban medical communities, in
eliminating any residual use of the locality rule, 157 and in providing both
physicians and plaintiffs a resource that ensures compliance with customary
practice.158 It would seem indefensible to cling to any exception to a
nationalized standard of care in light of the availability of such an information
resource. Furthermore, as MEDLINE use becomes increasingly widespread,
the rate at which information assimilation occurs within the medical community
will undoubtedly become more rapid. Therefore, it behooves any prudent
physician, regardless of her location, to perform a literature search at some
point during a patient encounter in order to keep abreast of changes in
customary practice.
MEDLINE's greatest asset is its ability to give physicians the knowledge of
3600 journals when diagnosing and treating. However, as long as custom is
entrenched as the mainstream malpractice standard, the legal role of MEDLINE
may be practically limited to defensive use by physicians as a liability insulating
device.
2. The Alternatives
a. Departures from Custom and MEDL NE's Relevance
As mentioned above, there are courts that refuse to consider custom as
conclusive evidence of reasonableness, allowing the trier of fact to pass on the
reasonableness of a defendant physician's conduct notwithstanding adherence to
customary procedure. 159 Regardless of how the court accomplishes this,
whether by elimination of the "minimally competent physician" comparison or
by subordinating custom to a nonconclusive status, the main target of the
inquiry is not whether custom was followed, but whether the defendant's
conduct was in accordance with a reasonable physician.
As this inquiry opens the door to evidence other than that which shows a
failure to follow customary practice, plaintiffs in these jurisdictions can argue
that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable regardless of traditional medical
standards. Recent nonmainstream developments located on MEDLINE, which
157 See discussion supra note 142.
158 This is particularly relevant to what Furrow labels the "reluctant practitioner" who
refuses to adopt the applicable customary standard of care in a particular case. Under the
traditional rule, this deviation from the standard would be conclusive evidence of malpractice
if proven by the plaintiff. See Barry R. Furrow, The Causes of "Wrongful Life" Suits:
Ruminations on the Diffitsion of Medical Technologies, 10 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 11,
13 (1982).159 See cases cited supra note 109.
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would be legally irrelevant in jurisdictions giving medical custom conclusive
weight, can be introduced as evidence that the defendant physician followed an
unreasonable course of conduct. In this way, a MEDLINE search could be
indirectly imposed as a legal necessity, by forcing physicians to conduct an
effective literature search for fear that an inquisitive plaintiff's attorney will
perform one. Should a plaintiff find reliable data that calls customary practice
into question, the defendant physician may be deemed to have acted
unreasonably for failure to discover or consider it. While no cases to date
describe such a tactic, at least one court allowed a defendant physician to
introduce evidence of a computer literature search, 16° and yet another alluded
to the possibility that failure to conduct a literature search may be applicable to
medical negligence. 161
There are additional legal hurdles, however, that a plaintiff must navigate
before a successful judgment is obtained-namely, whether the failure of the
defendant physician to conduct a MEDLINE search is indeed unreasonable. 162
Again, it is not the use of MEDLINE itself that is the focus of the
reasonableness inquiry, but the underlying results of the search that must be
evaluated in determining whether defendant's omission was negligent. The
question for the trier of fact is not whether the defendant's use or nonuse of the
MEDLINE device was unreasonable given the circumstances but, instead,
whether the defendant's failure to consider or follow the procedure, treatment,
or study accessible through a MEDLINE search was unreasonable. Only then
160 See Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Minn. 1980). The court ruled that the
empty results of the defendant's computer search was nonhearsay because it was not offered
for the truth of any matters asserted in the literature, but merely as evidence that the plaintiff's
expert was incorrect in stating that there was such literature available. See id. Therefore, the
case has limited applicability to a situation where a plaintiff wishes to use the results of such a
search as evidence that the defendant could have successfully relied upon an alternative
procedure.
161 See Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1984). Note,
however, that the court held that the physicians' failure to conduct a literature search was
significant to the trial court finding on informed consent. The court expressly limited the
holding to the informed consent situation, and reserved judgment on applicability to other
theories of malpractice liability. See id.
162 A plaintiff would also be forced to prove that the defendant's omission was the actual
and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The causation element presents additional
hurdles for the plaintiff, as proving harm from an omission is a difficult burden to bear.
Assuming the omitted procedure or treatment is sufficiently reliable and proven, the plaintiff
would likely be able to show that the omission of the MEDLINE search, and thus the failure
to rely on such a finding, was, more likely than not, the cause of the harm. Conversely,
where the results of a particular study are less than convincing, proving causation becomes
more problematic for the plaintiff.
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would one's failure to consult MEDLINE be negligent.
For example, if the MEDLINE search locates a single article detailing an
innovative, but experimental, treatment for a certain illness, with questionable
and unproven methodology, the physician's failure to follow this course of
conduct would probably not be found negligent.163 Likewise, her failure to
conduct a MEDIJNE search and to consider the study would be irrelevant,
since any reliance on the underlying result of this search would not be poor
medical practice regardless of its potential effectiveness. Had the defendant
relied on this procedure, resulting in the plaintiff's harm, the plaintiff would
likely have a successful malpractice suit, 164 not because the defendant deviated
from custom, but because her reliance on a single questionable study was
inconsistent with the practice of a reasonable physician. On the other hand, if a
certain noncustomary procedure or treatment with well-founded methodology is
found in multiple articles and is retrievable via a MEDLINE search, a
defendant's failure to consider or follow this research could be found to be
negligent. This is provided that the physician's nonreliance on the MEDLINE-
generated alternative was unreasonable (i.e. not in accord with what a
reasonable physician would have done), in comparison to customary
procedure. 165
Ultimately, the focus of this inquiry is whether disregarding information
found in medical literature via a MEDLINE search is negligent relative to the
physician's actual course of conduct. A plaintiff would be required to introduce
this information with the assistance of medical experts, 166 who would then offer
their opinion as to the defendant's omission in light of the foregone MEDLINE
data.' 67 The defendant physician, of course, would be free to offer her own
data and expert testimony refuting the plahiff's theory as to what, in fact, a
163 As Furrow explains, the innovative physician who wants to use a new diagnostic
procedure or treatment plan which has not yet been incorporated into mainstream utilization
may incur liability "if the procedure has received little support in the medical literature, and if
it does not work properly." Furrow, supra note 158, at 14.
164 See id.
165 As Furrow explains, "An emerging consensus by researchers may not be adopted by
practitioners for reasons related to their nature of practice. In such cases, courts have been
willing on occasion to treat compliance with customary practice as only partial, not conclusive
evidence of the standard of care, where the plaintff can present evidence as to the emerging
consensus." Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
166 See discussion supra note 88.
167 Cf. King, supra note 25, at 1241. Here, King describes the inevitable necessity of
having a medical expert offer her opinion, regardless of whether the court relies on custom as
conclusive. See id. The difference, however, is that the opinion would not be to establish the
custom and habit of the medical community, but would be an opinion as to the "reasonable
expectations" of the profession's members. See id.
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reasonable physician would have done under the circumstances. It would be left
for the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant physician's failure to
follow the plaintiffs proposed alternative was unreasonable in light of this
competing testimony and the various costs and benefits associated with both the
customary and noncustomary procedures.168
However, this proposed legal scheme is problematic. First, while there is
evidence that courts are beginning to relax in their deference to customary
medical practice, the movement is far from widespread. Moreover, many of
these courts tend to limit their fiat to Helling-like situations, where the medical
community is clearly lagging behind an established, cost-effective, and
scientifically reliable trend, 169 or where the defendant is clearly aware of the
dangers of following customary practice. 170 Thus, as a conduit through which
new, medically sound procedures and developments can be more readily
assimilated into clinical practice, even MEDINE may not be effective where
courts require such obvious evidence of the medical community's neglect.
Second, while the evidentiary standards for admitting scientific evidence
were relaxed by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,171 the case is not a panacea. In Daubert, the Supreme
Court abandoned the so-called "Frye test," 172 which required that scientific
tests or theories be generally accepted in their particular field as a prerequisite
to admissibility, 173 and adopted a more flexible approach. 174 The Court recited
a nonexhaustive list of factors that judges could consider in determining
whether to admit scientific evidence, including (1) whether the theory or
technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has
been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4)
whether standards controlling the technique's operation exist and were
maintained; and (5) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted. 175
Thus, while "general acceptance" by the scientific community is no longer the
sole factor for admissibility vis-i-vis Frye, it remains a factor for the trial court
to consider when making its evidentiary ruling.
168 See id. at 1241-42.
169 See cases cited supra note 109.
170 See cases cited supra notes 120-21.
171 509 U.S. 579 (1993). As a malpractice action ordinarily arises under state law, an
analysis of the federal rules of evidence may seem inappropriate. However, because the
majority of state evidentiary codes track the federal rules verbatim, federal case law
construing the federal rules is normally deemed persuasive in state court. See CHmUSrOPHR
B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KmKPATRiCK, EviDENCE § 1.2, at 4 (1995).
172 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
173 See id. at 1014.
174 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-97.
175 Id. at 593-94.
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What does Daubert portend for malpractice plaintiffs seeking to introduce
evidence of a novel medical technique or study uncovered by a MEDLINE
search? Ordinarily, the very reason a plaintiff resorts to MEDLINE is the
failure of her doctor to adopt a newly developed procedure or technique.
However, literature uncovered by a database search will often not be generally
accepted by the medical community. Certainly, admissibility will be more likely
under Daubert's flexible approach than under Frye, particularly where the
technique survives peer scrutiny. Nevertheless, general acceptance remains a
part of the admissibility gateway, and courts may attach inordinate weight to
Daubert's general acceptance prong176 leaving plaintiffs with problems similar
to those encountered in jurisdictions deferring to medical custom.
Most importantly, there is still a question as to whether judges or juries are
even capable of determining reasonable conduct, particularly when the medical
community itself rarely agrees on standard policy. 177 Both courts and scholars
defend customary deference on the ground that medical judgment cannot, and
should not, be questioned by the layperson because it is too complex and the
human body too temperamental. 178 Thus, any post-judgment evaluation should
be left to the physician's peers. Others suggest that the medical practice is not
susceptible to evaluation through ordinary principles of common sense and
reasonableness. 179
Regardless of these difficulties, physicians would be well advised to utilize
MEDLINE's capabilities, particularly in jurisdictions that have either modified
or eliminated the role of medical custom in determinations of negligence. As
courts continue to reconsider their malpractice formulations, and continue to
allow plaintiffs to present evidence other than that evidencing deviation from
customary practice, physicians will become increasingly accountable for on-line
information.
b. The Reasonableness Inquiry: Practical Problems and Technical
Dificulties with MEDLINE Searching
While the capabilities of on-line medical information are seemingly infinite,
there are practical limitations that temper MEDLINE's clinical effectiveness.
176 See MuMLLM & KIRATRICK, supra note 171 § 7.8, at 749-50; see also 2
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EvIDENCE § 702.5, at 83-89 (4th ed. 1996)
(explaining that some state courts have less than enthusiastically received the Daubert
approach and have favored a test more in tune with Frye).
177 See 1 FtmRow Er AL., supra note 22, § 6-2(a), at 362; see also Mehlman, supra
note 97, at 376.
178 See McCoid, supra note 73, at 607-08.
179 See, e.g., Pedigo v. Roseberry, 102 S.W.2d 600, 607 (Mo. 1932).
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Moreover, these flaws are fundamental to any discussion of legal incorporation.
Although physicians are expected to make themselves aware of the existence of
information that is relevant to their patient's condition and that is reasonably
available,180 whether it is reasonable to hold physicians accountable for all
information theoretically accessible by virtue of a MEDLINE search is
necessarily limited by the information's realistic availability. If a physician
cannot realistically access this wealth of information, it is unjust to hold her
accountable for following, or even considering, it.
i. Everything Isn't Everything: Incompleteness and Inefficiency
While medical databases such as MEDLINE do indeed contain voluminous
amounts of medical literature, they are far from complete, comprehensive
collections. Only one in six of the world's biomedical journals are included in
the MEDLINE system. 181 This problem Can be alleviated, at least in part, by
subscribing to databases in addition to the MEDLINE system, such as the
NLM's AIDSLINE, CHEMLINE, TOXLINE, and DIRLINE, all of which are
accessible via the Grateful Med software package.182
An additional problem is the inevitable lag time between the date an article
is published and its inclusion within the database. This phenomenon occurs
because of delays both in the arrival of journals at the NLM and in data entry
and indexing.' 8 3 One clinician manually located two relevant publications, one
from mid-September and another from early October, that were not posted on
the MEDLINE system as of mid-November. 184 Still, the MEDLINE route does
provide the largest number of relevant and timely articles per unit of search
time invested. 185
Another barrier to effective MEDLINE searching concerns the system of
MeSHs, which allows searchers to retrieve documents by inputting certain pre-
indexed terms. These MeSH keywords are determined by a trained indexer
upon reading the particular full-text article. However, since indexers have
minimal clinical training, and many of the terms physicians use have no
corresponding MeSH equivalent, terms commonly utilized in medical practice
180 See Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that
physician is responsible for that which is material and reasonably available with regard to
informed consent).
181 See Wyatt, supra note 17, at 1371.
18 2 See NLM, GOOD MEDICINE, supra note 30.
183 See Wyatt, supra note 17, at 1368.
184 See Haynes et al., supra note 16, at 639.
185 See id.
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are often not adequately searchable. 186 For example, the terms "intrauterine
hypoxia" and "birth asphyxia," while common labels for clinicians, are not
indexed within the MEDLINE system. 187 Thus, when a physician is unfamiliar
with the MeSH vocabulary, a MEDLINE search using terms common to the
physician may result in an incomplete or even fruitless search with the
physician being oblivious to the deficiency.
Other users find the headings themselves neither complete nor sufficiently
cross-referenced. In a recent trial, three clinicians, after performing an
extensive six-year manual literature search on the subject of perinatal asphyxia,
attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of the MeSH indexing system. Diligently
following the MeSH system, these physicians substituted commonly used
clinical language with their appropriate MeSH substitutes. Their resulting
MEDLINE search neglected to locate fifteen percent of the relevant hand-
searched articles. 188 Therefore, even when a physician resorts to the
MEDLINE-provided list of MeSH- terms, it is possible that hand-searched
articles will be overlooked by the computer, regardless of how aggressive and
skilled the user is.
The legal relevance is clear. It is entirely possible that a physician,
employing the standard MEDLINE search techniques can, through no fault of
her own, fail to discover a number of relevant clinical studies-studies which
may have had an impact on her patient's treatment. If a plaintiff's attorney, via
her own diligence or by using an experienced research librarian, manages to
stumble upon such studies, it would seem unjust and perhaps unreasonable to
find the physician negligent for her omission, regardless of the article's medical
efficacy.
ii. Doctors Are Not Librarians: Search Difficulties
Computer databases present yet another practical barrier to clinicians-the
procedural difficulty in accessing information. Studies show that even when
physicians are adequately trained in MEDLINE searching, their searches are
effective less than fifty percent of the time,189 , far less effective than most
research librarians and far too ineffective to allow a finding of negligent
omission. Physician searches generally retrieve less relevant data, and more
irrelevant data than an experienced database user because of the physician's
186 See Wyatt, supra note 17, at 1371.
187 See Maria Jesus Largaespada et al., How Accurate Are Bibliographic Databases?,
1988 TrHE LANCEr 538, 538 (Letter to the Editor).
188 See id.
189 See Haynes et al., Online Access to MEfDLINE in Clinical Settings: A Study of Use
and Usefidness, 112 ANNALs OF INTERNALMED. 78, 79-83 (1990).
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failure to use advanced searching techniques. 19 0 This results in increased on-
line time and higher medical costs. 191 While there is evidence that these results
can be improved with extensive training, 192 even those physicians who are so
trained often do not consistently find the same information as compared to other
similarly trained searchers. 193
Since data retrieval is an art in and of itself, holding physicians accountable
for information obtained as part of a perfectly conducted MEDLINE search
would essentially result in judging physicians on their ability to conduct
computer searches, not on practicing medicine. One could argue, of course,
that such searches are now a part of any competent medical practice, and that
computer searching is now a skill that any medical professional must possess
before considering herself adequately and reasonably trained.194
ini. Financial Barriers
While many physicians see monetary expense as a significant barrier to
MEDLINE access, 195 it is far less an obstacle to incorporating a database
search into a medical practice than one might think. The cost of personal
computers has dropped dramatically in recent years, as has the cost of requisite
peripheral hardware and software. 96 The NLM provides access to Grateful
Med search software for $29.95 and an average on-line search ranges from
$1.25 to $5.00, depending on the amount of information viewed, downloaded,
or printed. 197 This cost will obviously decrease in relation to the user's
searching speed and skill. The relatively low cost of the service is cited by
physicians as an important factor in choosing to access the MEDLINE
system.' 98 Searching via MEDUINE undoubtedly is far more cost-effective
than the standard manual literature search.
However, while cost is not a major issue to the average urban physician, it
190 See id.; see also McKibbon et al., supra note 4, at 591.
191 See McKibbon et al., supra note 4, at 591 (noting that physician's search costs were
almost double that of a librarian searcher).
192 See, e.g., Haynes et al., supra note 189, at 83 (noting that studies indicate that
clinical end-users can be competent searchers with practice); McKibbon et al., supra note 4,
at 591 (finding that recall performance of experienced end-users approximated that of
librarians).193 See McKibbon et al., supra note 4, at 586-90.
194 See Hafier et al., supra note 134, at 188.
195 See Dalrymple, supra note 45, at 231.
196 See generally Mark Potts, High-Tech Price Qas: Putting the Byte on a Computer,
WAsH. PosT, Mar. 23, 1992 (Washington Business), at 15.197 See NLM, GOOD MEDICINE, supra note 30.
198 See Lindberg et al., supra note 1, at 3128.
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has greater relevance to rural medical practices where advanced medical
technology is often unaffordable and, subsequently, unavailable. With the
virtual elimination of the locality rule199 from modem U.S. malpractice
jurisprudence, physicians in even the most rural of medical settings are held
accountable for information existing outside their immediate practice vicinity.
Such accountability will only be enhanced by MEDLINE; the information
revolution is already cited as a significant force behind the movement of courts
away from the traditional locality exception.200
Some courts adopt a resources-based caveat to the locality rule's
elimination. In Hall v. Hilbun,20 1 the Supreme Court of Mississippi proposed
an exception to the much maligned locality rule by holding physicians to a
standard of care commensurate not only with the minimally competent
physician in the same practice in the United States, but with a physician who
has the same general facilities, services, equipment, and options available to
her.202 While such an exception might seem to include computerized database
access, the cost of such an adequate set-up is relatively low, particularly in
relation to the cost of defending a malpractice claim203 for failure to be
cognizant of a customary procedure. Furthermore, in light of the movement
toward a nationalized standard of medical care, MEDLINE is the ideal way to
ensure that rural communities at least have access to the latest medical
information, even if technological limitations do not allow the performance of
these innovations in the rural medical office.204
iv. Information Overload, for What?
It is said that physicians are exposed to "information overload"
immediately upon entering medical school. 205 A study performed in England
indicated that medical students were required to learn 47,900 various facts and
199 See discussion supra note 142.
200 See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 870 (Miss. 1985) ("All the while
[physicians] have ready access to professional and scientific journals and seminars for
continuing medical education from across the country.").
201 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
202 See id. at 872.
203 During 1984 (the latest year for comprehensive statistics), the American insurance
industry settled approximately 73,500 malpractice claims against 103,300 health care
providers. The average payment was $80,741, and the largest single payment was $2.5
million, with the year's total at $2.6 billion. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACrCE: CHARACrERISTCs OF ClAims CLOsED IN 1984 (1987).204 See 61 AM. JuR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 210, at 342-43 (1981).
20 5 See J. Anderson & A. Graham, A Problem in Medical Education: Is There an
Information Overload?, 14 MED. EDuc. 4 (1980).
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29,900 different medical concepts, indexed in medical textbooks by 19,800
individual terms, or stated another way, an average of twenty-four facts or
concepts during every hour of the first two years of medical study.206 The
expansive volume of medical literature is a major reason for the medical
community's failure to both arrive at concise practice guidelines207 and keep up
with medical advances. 208 On-line medical literature databases like MEDLINE
only add to this mass of information and may further cloud the physician's
judgment as to what is reasonable medical practice.
Furthermore, while questions are often generated by the health care
professional,209 medical literature is often not an effective source for the
answers. Studies suggest that a significant factor in a physician's failure to
resort to medical literature is the inapplicability of such literature to clinical
problems. 210 In order for the medical literature to be useful to clinicians, it must
answer questions that arise in patient care, measure clinically relevant variables,
and use research designs most likely to yield valid medical conclusions. 211
It is also important to note that merely reading medical literature cannot
alone provide the reader with actual working knowledge of the procedures or
techniques described therein.212 Such knowledge is only gained through
personal evaluation and practice, a process which in turn generates the
confidence required to actually employ this knowledge in the clinical setting. 213
Information-based liability may inappropriately and unjustly equate awareness
of medical information with knowledge of that information.214 Again, as
MEDLINE is merely a retrieval device, it can do nothing to enhance the
206 See id. at 6-7.
207 See Wyatt, supra note 17, at 1368.
208 Another reason is the rush of technology. See, e.g., Barak Gaster, The Learning
Curve, 270 JAMA 1280 (1993) (telling story of older surgeon's struggles in keeping up with
innovative surgery techniques).209 See generally Covell et al., supra note 17.
2 10 See Greer, supra note 27, at 23 (discussing the failure of the scientific literature to
speak effectively to the clinician).
211 See id.
212 See Kibble-Smith & Hafner, supra note 22, at 91 (quoting Thomas J. Harlan, Jr., A
Statewide Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Cases-We're Shoveling Smoke, 18 U.
RicH. L. REv. 361, 372 (1984)).
213 See Greer, supra note 27, at 23.
2 14 See Kibble-Smith & Hafher, supra note 22, at 91-92. This burden, however, may be
justified as an acceptable cost of improving the medical community's ability to process and
manage information, which may lead to better patient care. See id. ("[The increased




practical significance or inherent limitations characteristic of published medical
literature.
IV. CONCLUSION
Computer information technology is progressing at an unprecedented rate,
as is the volume of innovative medical literature. Nevertheless, it seems that
mandating the use of, or even admitting evidence gleaned from, a computerized
MEDLINE search is, as yet, unworkable, particularly in light of the database's
inherent limitations. Furthermore, absent a strong legal movement toward the
adoption of a general negligence approach to the traditional malpractice
standard, or a case of legally mandated standard-setting vis-A-vis Helling, the
national, scope of any indirect incorporation of such a requirement into the
standard of care required by reasonable physicians will be limited.
However, that is not to say that the discussion of such a possibility is moot.
There is adequate case law to support the proposition that courts are willing to
adopt a Helling approach when omission of a service becomes indefensible.
Moreover, there is a growing number of jurisdictions that are abandoning
custom in favor of the "reasonable physician" approach. MEDLINE may also
further solidify the movement toward nationalizing medical standards and
implementing practice guidelines by offering a source through which all
physicians can quickly obtain information regarding relevant nationally adopted
procedures.
Ultimately, however, the onus of using MEDLINE will fall on the custom-
makers-the medical community. Prudent physicians should use MEDLINE
preventatively to avoid falling behind custom. As MEDLINE use and
effectiveness continues to increase, so will the assimilation of new medical
procedures, treatments, and techniques into the mainstream medical
community, even absent a firm judicial mandate. Furthermore, custom does not
always equate with "good medical practice." Therefore, physicians have an
ethical, if not legal, duty to at least consider recent medical literature before
blindly adopting a traditional course. Regardless of MEDLINE's functional
limitations, incorporating a MEDLINE search into one's diagnosis and
treatment protocol is not only legally preventative, but also is simply good
medicine.
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